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Personal Narratives and Policy: Never the Twain? 
Morwenna Griffiths and Gale Macleod,   
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
In this paper the extent to which stories and personal narratives can and should be 
used to inform education policy is examined. A range of studies describable as story 
or personal narrative is investigated. They include life-studies, life-writing, life 
history, narrative analysis, and the representation of lives. We use ‘auto/biography’ as 
a convenient way of grouping this range under one term. It points to the many and 
varied ways that accounts of self interrelate and intertwine with accounts of others.  
That is, auto/biography illuminates the social context of individual lives.  At the same 
time it allows room for unique, personal stories to be told. We do not explicitly 
discuss all the different forms of auto/biography.  Rather, we investigate the 
epistemology underlying personal story in the context of social action.  We discuss 
the circumstances in which a story may validly be used by educational policy makers 
and give some examples of how they have done so in the past.  
 
CONTEXT 
In this section the range and variation of research which is included under the 
designation 'narrative research' is considered along with reasons for adopting the 
alternative title of ‘auto/biography’.1 The current enthusiasm for 'narrative research' 
more generally in education is outlined. Finally, and briefly, the purposes of 
educational research are examined along with implications for the usefulness of 
auto/biography arising from different views about what research is for.  
 
Narrative research is generally contrasted with positivist accounts of research and 
seen as part of the move away from the search for a generalisable objectivity to a 
valuing of, and interest in, individual experience and personal stories (e.g. Casey, 
1995/6; Fraser, 2004). As Kvernbekk (2003) notes, the concept of narrative is 
'crucially vague'. If humans are conceptualised as 'storytelling organisms' who lead 
'storied lives', any attempt to understand their experiences - as individuals or in social 
groups - may be seen as an enquiry into their stories (Connelly and Clandinin, 1990). 
As a consequence it would appear that, for some, almost any qualitative research 
could reasonably come under the heading of narrative. However others have sought to 
be more prescriptive in defining narrative: for Polkinghorne (1995) narrative is a 
storied text in which events are brought together into a unifying sequence in which 
there is a plot, and for most this notion of causal sequence is a necessary element of a 
narrative (Kvernbekk, 2003). For Polkinghorne a narrative analysis need not be based 
on data which take narrative form; rather the narratival element is to be found in the 
story which the researcher constructs or re-constructs to make sense of data in any 
form.  Here the narrative is the product of the analysis and not the starting point. 
Smeyers and Verhesschen (2001) draw on the work of Polkinghorne (1995) and 
Bruner (1986) in distinguishing between the analysis of narrative, in which the 
narratives are the data and the aim is to identify common themes and their 
interrelation, and narrative analysis in which the aim is to understand the particular 
instance.  
  
We have chosen to use the phrase 'auto/biography' to describe the approaches to 
research which we examine. This marks our focus, which is specifically on personal, 
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individual stories, within the broad category of 'narrative research'.  'Auto/biography' 
may be used to cover life-stories and life history (e.g. Atkinson, 1998; McNulty, 
2003; Chaitin, 2004; Thompson, 2004; Arad and Leichtentritt, 2005; Sanders and 
Munford, 2005; Stroobants, 2005) life-writing and personal histories, (e.g. Bullough, 
1998: Couser, 2002; Eick, 2002), narrative analysis (e.g. Reissman, 1993; Franzosi 
1998) and the representation of lives (e.g. Richardson, 1992; Santoro, Kamler and 
Reid, 2001). In practice it would seem that some writers use these terms 
interchangeably, whereas for others a key aim of the project is to distinguish between 
terms (e.g. Jolly, 2001; Smith and Watson, 2001). Drawing such distinctions is not a 
purpose of this paper. Rather, in using the term auto/biography, we distinguish our 
focus on personal and individual accounts from those accounts such as vignettes and 
fictionalised stories which are intended to present a generalised picture of qualitative 
data: these are forms of 'boiled down' qualitative data which no longer embody the 
particular (e.g. Clough, 1996, 2002). 
 
The 'narrative turn' in the social sciences is usually fixed at around the early 1980s 
(Casey, 1995/6; Czarniawska, 2004), following a similar narrative turn in literary 
studies in the 1960s. The interest in narrative research has touched all of the social 
sciences - even in the apparently unlikely case of economics (McCloskey, 1990). It 
has particularly taken root in the areas of health (or, more accurately, illness) studies 
(Jordens and Little, 2004; Wetle, Shield, Teno, Miller and Welch, 2005), social work 
(Fraser, 2004; Glasby and Lester, 2005), and education (Pollard, 2005; Lawson, 
Parker and Sikes, 2006). It can be argued that the fundamental tenet of good practice 
in these disciplines is an assumption that development (learning, healing, personal 
growth) can only take place in the context of a relationship between practitioner and 
client, and so these 'helping' services are often delivered in the context of a personal 
relationship. Hence biography is already an accepted and valued aspect of work in 
these fields (Froggett and Chamberlayne, 2004). An alternative explanation for the 
popularity of narrative approaches in these practitioner areas is that they are 
disciplines dominated by women both in practice and in research, and there are close 
links between feminist research (along with other movements for social change) and 
auto/biography (Stanley, 1993; Casey, 1995/6; Mauthner, 2000; Townsend and 
Weiner, in preparation).  
 
As Oancea and Pring (this volume) make clear, we are living in the 'what works?' age 
of educational research in which the constant search is for interventions whose 
effectiveness has been scientifically 'proven'. The rise in interest in narrative research 
has been described as a 'clear reaction' to this breakdown of teaching into 'discrete 
variables and indicators of effectiveness' (Doyle, 1997, p. 94). This focus on 
'objective' research has fed a tendency to disregard the expertise of teachers in favour 
of the search for the elusive 'one size fits all' solution to effective teaching. An 
important element of auto/biography is that it focuses on the intersection between 
individual experience and the social context (Fischer-Rosenthal, 1995; Stroobants, 
2005). As Fraser observes, what she calls 'narrative approaches' have '…the capacity 
to attend to context as well as idiosyncrasy…' (2004, p. 181). Likewise, Frogget and 
Chamberlayne argue that (2004, p. 62) ‘Biographical methods can help restore the 
relationship between policy and lived experience by moving between the micro-and 
macro- levels’. In a similar vein, Avramidis and Norwich (2002) call for more 
research using alternative methods such as narrative and autobiography. They argue 
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that it is only through these methods that our understanding of the complexities of 
human behaviour in the social context can be developed. 
 
The main question addressed in this paper is whether auto/biography can and should 
inform policy. This raises the prior issue of the purpose of educational research and 
how this links to the purposes of policy makers. As Ozga (2004) notes, policy makers 
and researchers have different agendas, a point echoed by Hammersley (2002). These 
agendas may conveniently overlap at times in the pursuit of knowledge that has a 
practical use, but educational research is not limited to this purpose. Hammersley 
(2002) advocates a 'moderate enlightenment' view of educational research which 
seeks to provide understanding rather than solutions and which makes claims which 
are tentative. Similarly Munn (2005) distinguishes 'blue skies' research which 
produces knowledge which filters into the received wisdom and so indirectly 
influences policy, from 'applied research' which seeks to address the 'what works and 
why?' question.  Further, Munn (2005) argues for the particular importance of the 
'why' part of this question since it allows researchers to explore specific contexts and 
examine the complexities of policy implementation.  
 
In Hammersley's view, what educational research can provide is limited; in particular, 
he notes the well-known difficulties in deriving 'ought' from 'is'. The is/ought or 
fact/value distinction  was first raised as problematic by Hume and has been widely 
discussed since. Dennett (1995) disputes Hume’s argument in general. Earlier, Searle 
(1964) had argued that the distinction disappears in the case of some social facts such 
as promises. It may be argued, similarly, that in any case where there is agreement on 
normative judgements an argument can be made for empirical research having a role 
in showing that 'in order for x to happen you ought to do y'. (Or in showing that ‘y has 
no influence on x happening so you ought not to do it.’) As Biesta (2007) argues, the 
'what works' tradition makes the mistake of assuming the move from 'is' to 'ought' 
because it ignores the importance of normative practitioner judgements - which are 
not necessarily in agreement with those of the researcher or the policy maker. The 
role for the empirical researcher moves to: ‘If you want x to happen, y is one strategy 
you should consider.’ (Or, ‘...y is a strategy that is not worth considering.’). Biesta 
advocates a wider role for educational research which he terms 'cultural' and which is 
concerned with making problems visible and seeing things differently, and which, he 
argues, is rightly concerned with questions of ends as well as means. Indeed some 
traditions of research would see challenging orthodoxies as a fundamental purpose - 
rather than research being the route to getting politics out, it is seen by some as the 
way to get politics in (Gitlin and Russell, 1994). In a similar vein Ozga and Jones 
(2006) suggest that in the context of global 'travelling policy' there is a need to take 
account of research which addresses the normative question of what new education 
systems ought to look like in different contexts, taking into account issues such as 
poverty, life changes, and access to opportunities. Hogan (2000) deplores the vacancy 
in educational policy making which arises if it is not informed by a rich, qualitative 
understanding of education itself.  
 
Research, then, can be seen as generating understanding which may influence policy 
indirectly. Alternatively it can be seen as exploring the potential of solutions to 
problems. Moreover, it can explore reasons for why those particular solutions work 
and in what contexts. It has a role to play in challenging taken-for-granted 
assumptions about education, and in addressing the question of the proper 
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understanding of education itself. Auto/biography has a different contribution to make 
to each of these research goals, and each goal will articulate differently with policy at 
different levels and at the different stages of formation, implementation and 
evaluation.  
 
QUESTIONS OF CONFIDENCE  
Having outlined a contextual description covering the nature of auto/biography and 
educational research as understood in this paper, we now move to more precise 
questions about the evidential weight that can be placed on particular auto/biographies 
and whether policy makers can have confidence in them. 
 
Personal stories are sometimes dismissed as anecdotal.  They are also criticised for 
distorting the wider picture by overemphasising one, perhaps unrepresentative, case.  
Anecdotes are short biographical or autobiographical accounts of incidents, told 
because they are thought to be interesting, amusing or in order to make a debating 
point. They take the form of crafted stories, sometimes, like the urban myth, passed 
on orally, purporting to be from the life of ‘a friend of a friend’. While anecdotal 
evidence counts for little in research terms, it is, nevertheless, powerful in rhetorical 
terms.  Such stories are known to have the power to affect the audience.  No doubt 
this is why anecdotes are used in political presentations, such as party political 
broadcasts or policy pamphlets.  'Human interest' is said to hook readers of 
newspapers into reading an article.  Indeed, anecdotes can affect policy.  Anecdotes 
told to powerful people may change their minds about issues, where other sources of 
information and argument have not.  In research terms, an anecdote (as in ‘anecdotal 
evidence’) may also be a personal story told and heard without critical attention being 
paid to questions of context or reflexivity.  
 
We argue that although anecdotal evidence can be influential in policy terms it should 
not be.   It is especially important to be able to distinguish auto/biographical research 
from anecdote since one looks superficially like the other and both can be powerful, at 
least in individual cases. One concern of this chapter is to explain and justify the 
distinction. This kind of concern is not peculiar to auto/biographical research.  
Similarly, researchers need to be able to distinguish eye-witness accounts taken at 
face value from well-designed observational research evidence. Indeed this kind of 
distinction is not peculiar to qualitative research.  Quantitative research, too, needs to 
guard against putting too much weight on salient instances, for instance by over-
generalising from one school, one year or one intervention.  
 
If, as we are suggesting, auto/biographical research is more than anecdote, then the 
issue that becomes fundamental concerns how sound it is. We have chosen to use the 
term ‘sound’ because in logic it distinguishes truth from validity: that is, validity is a 
property of a logical argument, while truth is the property of a premise. Truth is a 
property of a conclusion only if both the premises are true and the argument is valid. 
So the question we are addressing in this chapter becomes:  
What are the characteristics of sound auto/biographical research in relation 
to policy decisions ? 
Further, insofar as there are different kinds of auto/biographical research, they are 
likely to have a differential relevance to the various possibilities and stages of policy 
formation. So a supplementary question addressed in this chapter is: 
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What kinds of sound contribution can different forms of auto/biography make 
to what kinds and stages of policy decision?   
 
These questions depend on assumptions about how soundness should be determined.  
And these assumptions are, in turn, dependent on epistemological positions. So we 
consider these first before returning to consider these two questions directly. We shall 
begin by looking at the epistemology of practical, human affairs. We then go on to 
look in more detail at epistemological issues underpinning auto/biographical research.  
 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL 
In this section we argue as follows. (1) Human institutions are made up of a plurality 
of unique human beings. (2) Therefore policymakers need to use an epistemology of 
the unique and particular. (3) What is needed is the kind of practical knowledge we 
can call praxis.  (4) This kind of practical knowledge is challenged by new 
perspectives which (5) will result in revisions. (6) Such new perspectives may be in 
the form of auto/biography. (7) The continuing process of revision means that praxis 
itself is historically specific.  
 
This volume has as one of its broad purposes the identification of the kinds of 
knowledge policy makers can properly use.  It is, therefore, concerned with the 
political and practical, what Arendt calls 'the realm of human affairs' (1958, p. 13) . 
That is, not only is it concerned with what ought to be done, and the place which 
knowledge has in determining that, but also it is concerned with the relationship that 
political decisions and actions have with knowledge.  In Aristotelian terms, politics is 
concerned with practical wisdom rather than with contemplation of eternal truths or 
with expertise. Aristotle’s useful distinctions are usually discussed using his original 
Greek terms because they have no simple translation in English (and were technical 
uses of common words even in ancient Greece).  Aristotle distinguished the practical 
wisdom (phronesis) needed to work with practical knowledge (praxis) from the 
theoretical wisdom (sophia) and theoretical understanding (episteme) needed to carry 
out enquiry into timeless truths (theoria).  Praxis is the kind of practical knowledge 
needed for the social and moral judgements made by the phronimos (the possessor of 
phronesis).  Aristotle also distinguished practical wisdom (phronesis) from the 
expertise (techne) needed to apply technical knowledge (poiesis) when making things.  
We first discuss praxis in relation to theoria and then go on to discuss it in relation to 
poiesis.   
 
Epistemology of the unique  and particular: action and theory 
Adriana Cavarero (2000) argues that the tradition of philosophy in which the unique 
and particular are subsumed in the universal is, at best, partial. In her (2002) article, 
'Politicizing theory', she argues that 'political theory' is an oxymoron.  She draws on 
Arendt to point out that the kind of universalising theory which contemplates abstract 
and universal objects is opposed to politics. In Aristotelian terms, theoria results in 
episteme rather than in praxis. 
 
Theory, Arendt points out, pertains to the bios theoretikos, which is explicitly 
distinguished from the bios politicos (1958, pp. 13-14).  The former is concerned with 
the contemplation of eternal truths.  The latter is a life of (public) action concerned 
with the 'shared and relational space generated by the words and deeds of a plurality 
of human beings' (Cavarero, 2002, p.506). This plurality is to be sharply distinguished 
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from any concept of the many which does not acknowledge individual differences. As 
Arendt (1958, p. 8) writes, ‘Plurality is the condition of human action because we are 
all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else 
who ever lived, lives, or will live.  Equally it is distinguished from a concept of the 
many which is simply an agglomeration of individuals who do not relate to each other 
(like, for instance, a cinema audience).  The bios politicos is found in the web of 
relationships (Arendt, 1958, p. 181) formed as a number of unique human beings 
come together to take collective action.  As Iris Marion Young explains (2000, p. 
111): 
 
For Arendt the public is not a comfortable place of conversation among those 
who share language assumptions, and ways of looking at issues…The public 
consists of multiple histories and perspectives relatively unfamiliar to one 
another, connected yet distant and irreducible to one another.  A conception of 
publicity that requires its members to put aside their differences in order to 
uncover their common good destroys the very meaning of publicity because it 
aims to turn the many into one.   
 
Individuals do not bring about actions in the public sphere by themselves. As decision 
makers they are always part of a web of social relationships.  Any action in the public 
sphere involves initiating change as part of that web of social relationships, and it is 
there that decision makers have an influence as unique individuals. Decision makers 
act in concert but it is a concert which is made up of distinct, different members. 
Their actions have an influence in the realm of human affairs, which is itself made up 
of webs of social relationship. These webs, too, are created by distinct and different 
human beings. This is the bios politicos, and it is where education policy makers find 
themselves. 
 
Cavarero expands on Arendt's argument, pointing out that to try to use theoria to 
generate phronesis is to have confused the object of knowledge for the two forms of 
life, bios theoretika and bios politicos. Theoria, the pursuit of enquiry in the bios 
theoretika, will not result in the praxis needed for the bios politicos.  She writes 
(2002, p. 512): 
 
Politics asks to be studied according to its own principles insofar as politics is 
a field of plural interaction and hence of contingency.  These principles, 
exemplarily illustrated by Hannah Arendt, have to do with the plurality of 
human beings insofar as they are unique beings rather than fictitious entities 
like the individual of modern political doctrine, and they have most of all to do 
with the relational dimension of reciprocal dependency. 
  
Cavarero goes on to consider how a unique human being may speak to decision 
makers.  Using the metaphor of voice, she explores the power of a unique voice to 
provoke a human response in the listener.  That is, the listener becomes fully aware of 
the humanity of the speaker: a speaker who is always unique but who is also always 
already in relation to other human beings.
2
   
 
Cavarero contrasts the account of the openness of the realm of human affairs with the 
lasting philosophical inheritance of Plato's desire to control the uncontrollable world 
of action by taking refuge in the reassuring world of theory.  This is, she argues, the 
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meaning of the myth of the cave. Plato 'designs the just city taking as his model the 
idea of justice he contemplated in his mind (500e-501c) ' (Cavarero, 2002, p. 507). 
She goes on to point out how influential the impetus towards control has been, as 
evidenced by the continued ascribed primacy of theory over practice. For instance, 
she writes: 
 
[Hobbes and Locke] confirm that political theory recognizes its specific object 
in an order -- governable and predictable, convenient and reassuring, just and 
legitimate -- that neutralises the potentially conflictive disorder inscribed on 
the natural or pre-political condition of human beings.  (Cavarero, 2002, p. 
511) 
 
This is a view in which theory means applying reason to find a system (or order) 
which can then be put into practice.   
 
Cavarero has pointed to a reason for the failure of 'political theory' to produce control.  
The impossibility of the task is not merely a contingent fact of history.  It is logically 
impossible: a search for a mirage -- or a snark (Carroll, 1974)  Human beings 
continually elude systems.  If rational persons did agree they would assent to the same 
rational systems.  However, they do not. Consider the Enlightenment in which both 
currents of political theorising can be found.  On the one hand is the tradition seeking 
control and order, grounded in theory.  On the other there is a tradition of critique 
(Foucault, 1984) grounded in theorising. Williams (2002, 4) points out that: 
 
A familiar theme of contemporary criticism of the Enlightenment…[is] that it 
has generated unprecedented systems of oppression, because of its belief in an 
externalised, objective, truth about individuals and society. This represents the 
Enlightenment in terms of the tyranny of theory, where theory is in turn 
identified with an external ‘panoptical’ view of everything, including 
ourselves. 
 
He contrasts this with another current in the Enlightenment, critique, which he argues 
has been a main expression of the spirit of political and social truthfulness. This spirit 
need not lead to anarchy. Rather, the kind of openness required by the bios politicos 
makes room for individuals to instigate change in a process of co-construction with 
others. In her 1963 book, On Revolution, Arendt commends episodes in history which 
were marked by change and revolution as examples of true politics but she is far from 
advocating perpetual revolution.   
 
Epistemology of the unique and particular: action and technique  
We have drawn attention to the way theory (theoria) consumes the particular in the 
universal. Another way in which the particular can be consumed in the universal is 
through conflating the practical knowledge needed for dealing with human beings 
with the practical knowledge needed for dealing with things or with law-governed 
behaviour (for instance, building bridges or predicting solar eclipses). This distinction 
is particularly significant in exploring the limitations of research into ‘what works’. 
Aristotle distinguishes praxis not only from episteme but also from poiesis.  Both 
poiesis and praxis exercise practical knowledge but they have very different relations 
to policy.  The first, poiesis, is productive and has to do with making. The second, 
praxis, has to do with how one lives as a citizen and human being and has no outcome 
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separable from its practice. Poiesis requires the technical knowledge possessed by an 
expert.  Aristotle calls this kind of knowledge techne. Dunne succinctly characterises 
this:  
 
Techne then is the kind of knowledge possessed by an expert maker: it gives 
him a clear conception of the why and wherefore, the how and with-what of the 
making process and enables him, through the capacity to offer a rational 
account of it, to preside over his activity with secure mastery. (Dunne, 1993, p. 
9) 
 
Just as theoria appears to offer the prospect of order and control so does techne.  
However poiesis and praxis are different. Praxis requires personal wisdom and 
understanding, not expertise. To quote Dunne again:  
 
[Praxis] is conduct in a public space with others in which a person, without 
ulterior purpose and with a view to no object detachable from himself, acts in 
such a way as to realise excellences that he has come to appreciate in his 
community as constitutive of a worthwhile way of life. ... praxis required for its 
regulation a kind of knowledge that was more personal and experiential, more 
supple and less formulable, than the knowledge conferred by techne. (1993, p. 
10) 
 
As the word ‘excellences’ indicates, to act with practical wisdom is necessarily also to 
act ethically.  As Dunne writes, [Aristotle’s] novel conception of phronesis, provided 
a rich analysis of the kind of knowledge that guides, and is well fitted to, 
characteristically human -- and therefore inescapably ethical -- activity (praxis)
 
(Dunne and Pendlebury, 2003, p. 200). 
To put this another way: as was remarked in the first section, ‘Context’, empirical 
research can only give information about what might work in certain circumstances, 
but the decision about what to do in any specific circumstance will always depend on 
normative judgements which have to be made by those who are there.  
 
Provisional knowledge and little stories  
We have been arguing that the kind of knowledge needed by policy makers is 
knowledge of particulars and specifics, rather than on the one hand, knowledge of 
universalisable theories and timeless truths, or on the other, knowledge of techniques 
and skills to turn out certain products. In Aristotelian terms, policy makers need to 
rely on praxis rather than, on the one hand, sophia and episteme, or on the other, 
techne. In more Arendtian terms, it is an epistemology underlying a life of (public) 
action rather than of labour or of contemplation. 
 
We now go on to remark that praxis is open to new perspectives and understandings.  
It is therefore open to revision, drawing on new perspectives offered by the singular 
and unique stories of individual human beings. Such revision means that any decision 
or policy is historically specific. So neither can ever be settled once and for all: both 
need to respond to changing circumstances and new ideas. 
 
Practical knowledge is developed in the realm of human affairs. Arendt's concept of 
natality is relevant here (Arendt, 1958).  Her concept of the realm of human affairs is 
one that is open to change, and indeed does change as new unique human beings are 
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born, come into the world and use their voices to act in it in concert with others: ‘The 
frailty of human institutions and laws and, generally, of all matters pertaining to men's 
living together, arises from the human condition of natality and is quite independent 
of the frailty of human nature‘  (Arendt, 1958, p. 191). Natality means that each of us 
is unique at the same time as being born into specific social and political contexts. 
Therefore, it is not just that we have not yet worked out perfect systems and strategies 
for age-old problems, such as how best to educate young people. And it is not just 
human nature that gets in the way of getting it right. It is also that real newness enters 
the world because of natality. New institutions appear, whether as formal or informal 
social groupings.  New ways of looking at things change our judgements and 
understandings about each other. 
 
Natality means that practical knowledge is subject to revision as new perspectives are 
encountered: it is always revisable.  New perspectives in themselves can change what 
we know and do as we make practical judgements and decisions
 
- what we perceive, 
what we judge to be at issue, and what we take our role to be.  As Smeyers and 
Verhesschen (2001) argue, educational problems arise in particular situations and 
contexts which are always subject to change, leading to new interpretations and new 
meanings. They give the example of the family: ‘Wide coverage of cases of child 
abuse…have perhaps inevitably cast the family in a different light…The context of 
trust has been undermined…In education we hear again the language of (children’s) 
rights‘ (Smeyers and Verhesschen, 2001, p. 82). 
Decisions about what to do, at every level from teachers in the classroom to national 
policy will change as a result of such changed perceptions and understandings. 
 
Such changes in perceptions and understandings may be expressed in the 
auto/biographies of everyone involved. And their stories will capture something of the 
specificity and context of these changes. Cotton and Griffiths (2007) argue that 
auto/biographies can be told in such a way as to have the power to change the 
understandings of their listeners  - and indeed those of the tellers - about educational 
policy and practice.  Cotton and Griffiths draw on research which presented 
auto/biographies told by marginalised people in specific social, political and historical 
contexts. One of these was told by a young woman articulating her feelings about 
being in school. Another was told by teachers about a disabled boy in a dance class.  
Both auto/biographies were told in the context of a changing curriculum (in the areas 
of mathematics and creativity, respectively) and illuminate some of the implications 
for social justice in schooling. 
 
The continuing process of revision means that practical knowledge (praxis) is 
historically specific.  Research of all kinds helps educators keep up with changing 
circumstances and ideas.  We have made this argument focusing on auto/biography 
but it is also true of other research methods.
3
 
 
QUESTIONS OF TRUTH AND VALIDITY IN AUTO/BIOGRAPHY 
If auto/biographies are a necessary part of an epistemology suitable for policy, then 
there must be ways of determining whether they can be trusted, whether they are 
sound.  There are two ways in which such soundness may be challenged.  Firstly it 
may be challenged on the grounds of truth.  Secondly its validity may be challenged.  
We take each in turn.  
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Truthfulness 
The question about truth is complicated by the academic arguments that rage in social 
sciences and the humanities about the nature of truth. These arguments are many-
sided and complex. There is no space here to do more than allude to them. Bridges’ 
influential article (2005) summarises some mainstream philosophical discussions 
about different theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, etc) in 
relation to education. These theories are discussed further in Heikkenen et al. (2000, 
2001) and in Hulton (2001). Other discussions are influenced by postfoundational 
philosophies. Walker and Unterhalter (2004) discuss the significance of multiple 
perspectives, experiences and interpretations when judging how far to trust a story or 
set of stories. MacLure (2003) draws on Derrida and Foucault to argue that truths are 
always textual,  discursive and suffused with power relations. Such truths cannot be 
straightforwardly reported, she argues. Lugones (1989) in a discussion of 
marginalised identity, expresses this as:  
So we know truths that only the fool can speak and only the trickster can play 
out without harm. (Lugones, 1989: 285) [ italics added] 
 
Bernard Williams (2002 ) suggests a useful strategy for sidestepping some of the 
arguments about the nature of truth.  He proposes that we focus less on truth and more 
on truthfulness. He points out that sceptics about truth within the humanities and 
social sciences nevertheless exhibit ‘this demand for truthfulness or (to put it less 
positively) this reflex against deceptiveness’ even though ‘there is an equally 
pervasive suspicion about truth itself’ (Williams, 2002, p. 1). He usefully 
distinguishes two basic virtues associated with truthfulness: accuracy and sincerity. 
He points out that ‘each of the basic virtues of truth involves certain kinds of 
resistance to what moralists might call temptation – to fantasy and the wish’ (p.45). It 
is relatively simple to judge accuracy and sincerity in the case of reporting facts about 
'middle sized dry goods', to use J.L. Austin’s phrase. Similarly, it is relatively simple 
when discussing shared contexts.  Judging accuracy and sincerity in the case of 
auto/biography is trickier.  However, it is a familiar trickiness.  In ordinary life we 
listen to and tell auto/biographies all the time.  We need to judge how far the stories 
we hear are accurate and told with sincerity.  We know, and indeed expect, them to be 
partial, self-serving, entertaining, persuasive and to draw on imperfect memories. All 
this is an inevitable part of understanding the unique and particular, the singular, 
individual voice. And it is routinely understood, as individual voices are, with the aid 
of intelligence and wisdom drawn partly from personal experience and partly from 
knowledge gained from other sources.   
 
First it is necessary to be clear what there is in an auto/biography to be accurate and 
sincere about. Most obviously there are facts about the memories being recounted: 
time, place, observable behaviour, etc. Secondly there are the feelings that accompany 
these memories. Feelings can be reported and also they will also affect how the facts 
are reported. Facts and feelings are rarely reported (or even reportable) in neutral 
terms. As Walker and Unterhalter observe: ‘Our stories do not speak for themselves, 
nor do they provide unmediated access to other times, places or cultures’ (2004, pp. 
285-6). Interpretation is unavoidable
4
, and the feelings of the participant will affect 
the interpretations made.  Finally, even as the facts and feelings are reported, the way 
they are understood and reported is responsive to who the audience is. Stroobants 
gives an example. Reflecting on research interviews about the learning process, she 
remarks:  
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It was not only me as a researcher who was trying to understand the stories in 
terms of learning. When telling their life story, the women were actively giving 
meaning to their life experiences…During the interviews some of the women 
gained insight…they could see some work experiences in a different light. 
(Stroobants, 2005, p. 50)  
 
Walker and Unterhalter (2004) provide another example of the effect of the audience. 
They argue that the lack of a feminist ethos in the audience for the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission changed how women’s stories of rape and sexual 
humiliation were told.  
 
Judging accuracy and sincerity is, then, precisely a matter for judgement, for 
weighing evidence, rather than a matter of rules or protocols. Researchers need to 
make such judgements and also to give an indication of how they made them, using 
evidence of how the auto/biographical accounts were produced, with what intended 
audience, for what purpose, and setting the judgment within as full an understanding 
of the cultural, political and personal contexts as could be obtained. We give two 
contrasting instances of how this may be done.
5
  
 
The introduction to the hugely influential book, Tell them from me is exemplary. Gow 
and McPherson begin by explaining that: 
 
[These accounts] have been written by young people who left school in 
Scotland in the second half of the 1970s…The book is about their experience, 
their opinions and feelings, about their grudges and gratitude. It is about the 
way education, work and employment seemed to young people. (Gow and 
McPherson, 1980, p.3) 
 
The following subheadings then structure the discussion preceding the accounts: 
‘Whose writings are these and why did they write?’ ‘Is the writing honest? For whom 
did leavers think they were writing?’ ‘How was the selection of writings made?’ 
‘How can we achieve better understanding and better practice?’ The second of these 
subheadings is particularly interesting. The question of audience and 
accuracy/sincerity are taken together.  Reasons for believing the young people had no 
reason to ‘play to’ any group, are given, as are reasons for both trusting -  and 
mistrusting - written accounts. Finally, Gow and McPherson write: 
 
We cannot, either logically or empirically, exclude the possibility that, once 
they had decided to comments, some at least commented mainly on what they 
had experienced as negative aspects of their schooling.  Whether such an 
orientation constitutes bias can, in part, be left to the reader to judge.  The 
writings that follow may occasionally read as resentful, unperceptive, hostile 
or partial. But do we feel in reading them that they were offered dishonestly, 
maliciously or frivolously?  Their transparency seems evident and their 
cumulative impact is convincing.  For example the disturbingly similar stories 
told by leaver after leaver in the opening chapters on belting, truancy and the 
neglect of non-certificate classes in fact reflect pupils’ experiences of more 
than 80 schools; the events were experienced, and the accounts were written, 
mainly in isolation one from another. (Gow and McPherson, 1980, p.13) 
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Stroobants describes another way of approaching the task of explaining how the 
stories told to her may be judged by the reader as accurate and sincere.  
 
I write in detail about how my grounded interpretation developed and grew, 
trying to do justice to…the stories…and to my own interpretation by 
alternately telling the life story of one particular woman in the story of my 
interpretive analysis process.  I also systematically describe and account for 
the methodological steps I took, elaborating my considerations and 
reflections… in order for the reader to be able… to judge the quality of the 
research report, the research results and the craftsmanship of the researcher. 
(2005, p.56) 
  
Validity 
Like the question of truth, the question about validity is complicated by academic 
arguments within social sciences. So far, we have been tacitly assuming a meaning for 
‘validity’ which is derived from formal logic. That is, validity refers to reasoning 
rather than to facts. However, the term, like ‘truth’, is subject to fierce debate within 
social science and the humanities. Much of this debate seems to be a response to the 
specialised use of the term in the natural sciences.  The natural sciences have 
developed a specialised, technical vocabulary suitable for themselves. In this 
discourse, ‘validity’ determines whether the research truly measures that which it was 
intended to measure or how truthful the research results are. One response has been 
post-modern playfulness. Suggestions for alternative understandings of validity 
include ‘rhyzomatic validity’ or ‘ironic validity’, as suggested by Patti Lather (1994). 
Altheide and Johnson (1998) list ‘successor validity’, ‘catalytic validity’ and 
‘transgressive validity’ among others.  Another response has been to ditch the concept 
altogether as being bound up with the quest for certainty (Altheide and Johnson, 
1998). In some discussions, ‘validity’ appears to have been equated with ‘quality’, as 
in the two linked articles by Hannu et al. (2007) and Feldman (2007). 
 
But social science and the humanities need not, and should not, be so reactive to 
definitions in the natural sciences. Instead we begin the discussion about validity from 
a more ordinary understanding of the term, (which does not require either 
measurement or certainty) and go on to refine this into a more specialised, technical 
meaning suitable for discussing auto/biography. 
 
We start from the common understanding of validity to be found in a dictionary 
definition. In this we follow J.L. Austin’s comment that distinctions ‘in ordinary 
language work well for practical purposes’ and this is ‘no mean feat’:  ‘ordinary 
language is not the last word…but it is the first word (Austin, 1979, p.185.) This 
strategy has the advantage that it builds on what generations of human beings have 
needed to say when making judgements about the stories they are told. The strategy 
leaves us free not to start from measurement. ‘Valid’ was not originally a word 
especially associated with measurement. Rather it comes from the Latin validus, 
meaning ‘strong’. The dictionary definition makes clear that there are various well 
known ways in which this can be understood. Merriam-Webster (2006-7) provides the 
following four current definitions: (1) legal efficacy or force; (2) well grounded or 
justifiable: being at once relevant and meaningful; (3) having a conclusion correctly 
derived from premises; (4) appropriate to the end in view – effective (as in ‘every 
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craft has its valid method’). The first of these is evidently not relevant here. The 
second, third and fourth are applicable, however. We take each in turn briefly 
describing the kinds of issue that need to be taken into account.  
 
The second definition of validity draws attention to the way that a story might be 
truthful – both accurately and sincerely told – and yet not be germane to the matter in 
hand. For an auto/biography to be relevant and significant it needs to be shown to be 
so with regard to its representativeness and/or the possibility it provides of re-framing 
the understanding of what is at issue. Sometimes auto/biographies are significant 
precisely because they are ordinary. That is, they show something of the lived 
experience of ordinary life in all its complexity and everyday differences between 
contexts. For instance, the stories of the student and the teachers in Cotton and 
Griffiths’ (2007) study are like this. They are unique, individual, personal - but they 
are not atypical. That is their significance. In contrast, auto/biographies may be 
significant precisely because they are not ordinary. The significance may arise 
because auto/biography is rarely heard from such an individual. Think, for instance, 
of very high and very low achievers in educational terms. And, again, some voices are 
much easier to hear than others, as feminist and Black scholarship has demonstrated 
over the last few decades. The auto/biographies of people marginalised for reasons of 
gender, race, disability and social class have much to offer to those decision makers 
striving for equality in education. Finally, an auto/biography may be relevant because 
of the way it helps its audience reframe an issue, by make the familiar strange, and 
giving a different perspective on what was previously taken for granted.
6
 
 
The third definition of validity draws attention to the kinds of conclusion that would 
be drawn from a truthful narrative, even after issues of representativeness, bias and 
the possibilities of reframing have been  considered. This is the area of criticality, and 
it points to a very large area in narrative studies, one that we can only allude to here. 
The key issues here are representation, genre and literary quality. Representation 
refers to the way that an auto/biography is presented not only by the teller but also by 
the researcher who is re-presenting it. All representation involves choices and 
judgements. The editing and framing of the story obviously require judgement. But so 
does the form in which it is told, what choices have been made about the medium in 
which is presented, and whether is presented as finished and definite or as just one 
possible presentation among many. Closely related to representation are the issues of 
genre and literary quality. The first refers to the way that any story is influenced by 
the genres available to the teller – both those of the original teller and those of the 
researcher. These include the wish for an expected happy and tragic ending, indeed 
for an ending at all: in short, for the auto/biography to work as a story. Literary 
quality draws on genre, but, for some researchers, it can also be a wider concern than 
this. For instance, one of Renuka Vithal’s four conditions for what she refers to as a 
‘crucial description’, is ‘transformacy’: the potential for it to effect transformative 
change in the reader (Vithal, 2002). This must be, at least partly, a matter of literary 
quality. Controversially, literary quality may also be associated with the use of fiction 
in the presentation of auto/biography. Walker and Unterhalter (2004) discuss the 
account of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s evidence by the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation journalist, Antjie Krog. In her book drawn from her two 
years reporting the Commission, she uses fiction about herself in order to present the 
stories more truthfully.  This relates to the fourth of the dictionary definitions above, 
too, since literary quality is part of the craft of story- telling. 
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The third definition not only draws attention to criticality but also to reflexivity. 
Conclusions are never drawn straightforwardly from stories. They are layered, and 
subject to a range of interpretations. They may be constructed and re-constructed 
according to the intentions and ideologies of the audience and the researcher. Gaps 
are noted. The teller’s intentions are assessed. The relation between the teller, 
audience and researcher is brought into focus. The personal story of the researcher 
also becomes significant, as does the relation that is drawn between the story and 
other educational research and policies. Explicit reflexivity on the part of the 
researcher allows the reader to be reflexive too.  
 
Truthful and valid auto/biography. 
We have argued that it is the responsibility of the researcher to present an 
auto/biography in such a way that judgements can be made about its truthfulness and 
validity. And it is also the responsibility of the researcher to present the 
auto/biography so that make the audience for the research is in a position to be able to 
make these kinds of critical assessment too. This is the difference between 
auto/biographical research and other kinds of personal story (auto/biography in 
general, anecdote, parable, gossip, etc). We have argued that sound auto/biographical 
research needs to show that the researcher has taken account of the following.  
(1) Truthfulness: accuracy and sincerity.  
(2) Representativeness.  
(3) Representation.  
(4) Re-framing of the matter at hand. 
(5) Genre. 
(6) Literary quality.  
(7) Reflexivity. 
Finally, and crucially, epistemologically sound auto/biographical research should be 
presented in such a way that readers can form their own assessment of its soundness. 
As in all research the story of researcher tells has itself to be shown to be trustworthy. 
 
CAN AND SHOULD POLICY MAKERS  USE AUTO/BIOGRAPHICAL 
RESEARCH? 
In this final section, the paper draws together the discussion on policy with that on the 
epistemological issues. It is proposed that at some stages of the policy cycle 
auto/biography and life writing research can, and in some cases can and should, be 
taken account of. Similarly it is suggested that auto/biography and life writing 
research is more or less appropriate for different levels and subjects of policy. Some 
examples are noted along with observations of where the scope of auto/biographical 
research could be extended.  
 
In order to say that auto/biographical research can influence policy one might want to 
find examples of instances in which it has influenced policy.  However assessing the 
impact of research is notoriously difficult (Nutley, Walter and Davies, 2007). As 
noted above the policy-making process is neither simple nor linear, and it is not 
always clear who is involved; even if it were and even if we had reports of what did 
or did not exert influence, we would probably not hear the full story.  However 
perhaps all that is needed to demonstrate the potential to influence is examples of 
situations in which auto/biography had such potential in the past, and examples of this 
kind are easier to find.  The work of Gow and McPherson (1980) has already been 
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noted: this research continues to be cited in government documents over 20 years later 
(Scottish Parliament, 2002).  Indeed government education departments throughout 
the UK are not only receptive to but actively seek out research which focuses on the 
experiences of individuals, much of which is collected in the form of personal stories. 
Munn et al's (2005) work on the deployment of additional staff to support behaviour 
in schools focused not only on what worked but also on why and in what contexts, 
exploring as it did the individual circumstances of staff and young people (Munn 
2005). The Department for Education and Skills (now the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families) has recently commissioned research on the experiences of 
young people permanently excluded from special schools and Pupil Referral Units in 
England and Wales, in which hearing the stories of these young people is a key 
element (Pirrie and Macleod, 2007).  
 
So, taking our weaker criterion - that auto/biography might have influenced policy -  
it is clear that this is easily met. The question then becomes ought auto/biography to 
influence policy, and, if so, which types/ levels of policy and at what stage. We have 
outlined the ways in which soundness can be established. We have shown that it is the 
responsibility of the researcher to show how readers can judge whether this has been 
done. We now go on to explore the different kinds of way in which auto/biographical 
research might influence policy.  
 
There are some areas of study to which auto/biographical research can be seen as 
being particularly well suited.  First, the experiences of people at the margins, such as 
those whose lives intersect more than one dimension of difference such as race, class, 
gender, disability, or sexuality.  Narrative research has been presented as a method for 
giving a stage to the voices of people who traditionally have had not been heard (e.g. 
Casey, 1995/6). As Biesta (2007) has observed, one of the roles of 'cultural' 
educational research is to allow the 'known' to be re-examined from a new 
perspective, perhaps shedding light on established hierarchies and problematising the 
taken-for-granted. Auto/biography, with its focus on examining the life of the 
individual in context, seems particularly well-suited for this purpose. Studies which 
address the experiences of people at the margins of our education system examine 
what it is like for those for whom the generalisations generated by other forms of 
research are unlikely to hold true.  Their 'little stories' have the potential to refine the 
'bigger picture' drawn by other studies. But should taking account of the personal be 
restricted to those at the margins? What of the personal experiences of those who do 
not find themselves on the edge? If the political is indeed personal then that holds for 
all, including those in the 'mainstream' and so a case can be made for saying that 
policy-makers ought to take account of auto/biographical research conducted with 'the 
generality' and not only the extremes. 
 
Secondly, research into experiences that unfold over time can be examined through 
longitudinal studies as people are followed over a number of years.  However a 
number of years are not always at the researchers' (not to mention policy-makers') 
disposal.  In such circumstances researchers who are interested in transitions often 
utilise life-history approaches. Examples of work of this type includes that by Watts 
and Bridges (2004) on aspirations of 16-19 year olds; McDowell's (2001) work with 
working-class young men, and Jones, O'Sullivan and Rouse (2004) examining school- 
to-work transitions.  All of these studies have at heart the questions of what does it 
feel like, what meanings do people make of, being in those situations over time, and 
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these cannot be answered except through an auto/biographical approach. Similarly 
Brannen, Mooney and Statham's work on care careers, following the lives of childcare 
workers, is being conducted with the express purpose of informing policy on 
recruitment into this area of employment (Thomas Coram Research Unit, 2007). So 
longitudinal accounts of what it is like to live through or in a particular system utilises 
research which draws on the stories of individuals involved. 
 
Finally, there may be areas of research in which large-scale quantitative studies, 
whilst being able to paint broad strokes, fail to capture the nuances of extremely 
complex situations.  An example of this is studies into youth resilience, in particular 
Michael Ungar's international work on the cultural specificity of resilience and the 
particular insights which can be gained from adding a narrative dimension to a 
research design (Ungar, 2004; 2006). 
 
There are also stages of the policy process to which auto/biographical studies are 
particular suited. Bridges and Watts (this volume) describe the complexities of the 
policy-making process: it is an iterative process which can start at the bottom, in the 
middle or at the top (Nutley et al., 2007).
7 
  Auto/biographical research may identify a 
problem which policy may be required to address, viewing things from a different 
perspective and thus identifying previously hidden issues - that is, it can contribute to 
the setting of the policy-agenda.  Auto/biography has  a contribution to make to the 
refinement of policy, its evaluation and 'fine tuning'. Finally, because of the ability of 
auto/biography to capture the individual experience in the wider social context, and to 
represent complex and nuanced situations, this approach has a contribution to make 
not simply to questions of 'what works?' but issues such as why, when and in what 
circumstances what works works, and why, when and where it doesn't. 
 
Thus auto/biography has a contribution to make to particular areas of study and to 
some parts of the policy-making process especially, but at the same time the policy 
discourse assumes that it lacks credibility as a sound way of conducting research to 
inform policy. The 'what works' agenda has become a discourse defining 'the limits of 
acceptable speech' (Butler, 1990) about the types of research which are taken 
seriously by policy-makers. However, whilst it has not been easy to find evidence of 
examples of auto/biographical research informing policy it is clear that contrary to 
popular belief auto/biographical research is alive and well.  So dominant is the notion 
that the only research which is being commissioned is in the 'what works' tradition 
that examples of government-sponsored research that are more auto/biographical in 
approach pass under the radar; we assume it is not happening because, of course, it 
couldn't be. However, scratch the surface and there it is. For instance, consider the 
following: Brannen, Stratham, Mooney and Brockmann, 2007; Cameron, Bennert, 
Simon and Wigfall, 2007; Cunningham and Hargreaves, 2007; Evans, Pinnock, 
Beirens and Edwards, 2006. They are all research projects using at least an element of 
auto/biographical method and all published on the Department for Children, Schools 
and Families website.   
 
In short, research continues to use auto/biographic approaches where these are the 
best way of addressing the issue or question to hand.  However the power of the 
policy discourse is such that these approaches barely dare to speak their name, but 
rather hide under blanket terms such as ‘qualitative’ and ‘case-study’. Ungar (2006) 
gives some interesting examples. He writes about strategies he has used to persuade 
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funders to give money for qualitative research (including life history work) - 
including 'dressing up' to make it look like quantitative research and 'sleeping with the 
elephant' - tacking a qualitative aspect onto a larger quantitative study. In this paper 
we have suggested criteria by which the soundness of auto/biographical research may 
be assessed. It is hoped that by so doing policy-makers may be able to have more 
confidence in taking account of research of this type, without comparing it against 
criteria designed for different approaches. 
 
On the grand level of what education is for auto/biographical research can offer 
insights. Smeyers and Verhesschen (2001) write that ‘ 
Freeing us from the idea that education must have a fixed and unified meaning will 
change what we want to do in education‘ (Smeyers and Verhesschen, 2001 p. 80). 
They are talking about philosophy, but their argument also works for auto/biography, 
not surprisingly since the title of the paper is ‘Narrative analysis as philosophical 
research’.  
 
Auto/biographical research has properly been used by policy makers and could be 
used more. It should continue to be a significant part of the evidence base for policy. 
Auto/biographical research is an essential contribution to the practical knowledge 
needed by policy makers. We have shown that it has a sound epistemological basis, 
when it is presented critically and reflexively, and with attention paid to how far it is 
truthful and valid: accurate, sincere, representative.  
 
References 
Altheide, D and Johnson, J (1998) ‘Criteria for assessing interpretive validity in 
qualitative research’ in Denzin, N and Lincoln, Y (eds) Collecting and 
Interpreting Qualitative Materials, (London, Sage) 
Arad, B. D. and Leichtentritt, R. D. (2005) Young male street workers: life histories 
and current experiences, British Journal of Social Work 35 (4) pp. 483-509 
Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition, (London and Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press) 
Arendt, H. (1963) On Revolution, (London, Faber & Faber) 
Atkinson, R. (1998) The life story interview Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications 
Austin, J.L. (1979) Philosophical Papers, (Third edition) Oxford University Press 
Avramidis, E. and Norwich, B. (2002) Teachers' attitudes towards 
integration/inclusion: a review of the literature, European Journal of Special 
Needs Education 17 (2) pp. 129-47 
Biesta, G. (2007) Why ‘what works’ won’t work. Evidence-based practice and the 
democratic deficit of educational research, Educational Theory 57(1) pp. 1-22 
Bolton, G. (2006) Narrative writing: reflective enquiry into professional practice, 
Educational Action Research 14 (2) pp. 203-218 
Booth, T. and Both, W. (2006) The uncelebrated parent: stories of mothers with 
learning difficulties caught in the child protection trap, British Journal of 
Learning Disabilities 34, pp. 94-102 
Brannen, J., Stratham, J., Mooney, A. and Brockmann, M. (2007) Care Careers: The 
Work and Family Lives of Workers Caring for Vulnerable Children, Research 
Brief available online at 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/TCRU-02-07.pdf [accessed 
25/7/7] 
 18 
Bridges, D (2003) Fiction written under oath? (London, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers) 
Bruner, J. (1986) Actual Minds, possible worlds (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press) 
Bullough, R. V. (1998). Musings on life writing: Biography and case studies in 
teacher education. In C. Kridel (ed.), Writing educational biography: 
Explorations in qualitative research (pp. 19-32) (New York, Garland) 
Burdell, P. and Swadener, B. B. (1999) Critical personal narrative and 
autoethnography: Reflections on a genre, Educational Researcher 28(6) pp. 21-
26 
Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, (New 
York, Routledge) 
Cameron, C., Bennert, K., Simon, A. and Wigfall, V. (2007) Using Health, Education, 
housing and Other Services: A Study of Care Leavers and Young People in 
Difficulty, Research Brief available online at 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/research/data/uploadfiles/TCRU-01-07.pdf [accessed 
25th July 2007] 
Carroll, Lewis, (1974) The Annotated Snark -  (ed. and intro. M Gardner), 
Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Casey, K. (1995/6) The New Narrative Research in Education, Review of Research in 
Education 21, pp. 211-253 
Cavarero, A. (2000) Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood (trans. Paul A. 
Kottmann) (London and New York, Routledge) 
Cavarero, A. (2002) Politicizing theory, Political Theory 30 (4) pp. 506-532 
Chaitin, J. (2004) My Story, My Life, My Identity, The International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 3 (4) pp. 1-17 
Clough, P. (1996) 'Again Fathers and Sons': the mutual construction of self, story and 
special educational needs, Disability & Society, 11 (1) pp. 71-81 
Clough, P. (2002) Narratives and Fictions in Educational Research, (Buckingham, 
Open University Press) 
Connelly, F. M., and Clandinin, D. J. (1990) Stories of Experience and Narrative 
Enquiry, Educational Researcher 19 (5) pp. 2 - 14 
Convery, A. (1999) Listening to teachers’ stories: are we sitting too comfortably? 
Qualitative Studies in Education, 12 (2) pp. 131-146 
Couser, G. T. (2002) 'Signifying Bodies: Life Writing and Disability Studies' in 
Snyder, S. L., Brueggemann, B. J., and Garland-Thomson, R. (eds) Disability 
Studies: Enabling the Humanities, (New York; Modern Language Association 
of America)  
Cunningham, M. and Hargreaves, L. (2007) Minority Ethnic Teachers' Professional 
Experiences: Evidence From the Teacher Status Project, Research Brief No 
RB853, (London, Department for Education and Skills) 
Curtis, K. (2002) Review essay of Cavarero and Riley, Political Theory 30 (6) pp. 
852-857 
Czarniawska, B. (2004) Narratives in Social Science Research, London, Sage 
Deneulin, S. and Hodgett, S. (2006) 'On the use of narratives for assessing 
development policy', paper presented at the International Conference of the 
Human Development and Capability Association August 29-Sept 1, Groningen 
Netherlands available online at 
http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs/5_4_DeneulinHodgett.pdf?PHPSESSI
D=5ebc1eae10b1ec6dcef1664ae68bdb45 (Accessed 30th May 2007) 
 19 
Dennett, D. (1995) Darwin's Dangerous Idea, (London, Allen Lane)  
Doyle, W. (1997) Heard any really good stories lately? A critique of the critics of 
narrative in educational research, Teaching and Teacher Education 13 (1) pp. 
93-99 
Dunne, J. (1993) Back to the Rough Ground: Practical Judgement and the Lure of 
Technique, (University of Notre Dame Press) 
Dunne, J. and Pendlebury, S. (2003)"Practical Reason," in The Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Education eds. N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith and P. Standish, 
(Oxford, Blackwell Publishing)  
Eick, C. J. (2002) Studying Career Science Teachers' Personal Histories: A 
Methodology for Understanding Intrinsic Reasons for Career Choice and 
Retention, Research in Science Education 32 (3) pp. 353-72  
Elbaz-Luwisch, F. (1997) Narrative research: political issues and implications, 
Teaching and Teacher Education, 13 (1) pp. 75-83 
Evans, R., Pinnock, K., Beirens, H. and Edwards, A. (2006) Developing Preventative 
Practices: the Experiences of Children, young People and their Families in the 
Children's Fund, Research Brief RB735; Department for Education and Skills 
Ezzy, D. (1998) Lived experience and interpretation in narrative theory: experiences 
of living with HIV/AIDS, Qualitative Sociology 21 (2) pp. 169-179 
Feldman, A (2007) Validity and quality in action research Educational Action 
Research 15 (1) pp. 21-32 
Fischer-Rosenthal, W. (1995) The Problem with Identity: Biography as Solution to 
Some (Post)-Modernist Dilemmas, Comenius' 15 (3) pp. 250-265 
Franzosi, R. (1998) Narrative Analysis - or Why (and How) Sociologists Should Be 
Interested in Narrative, Annual Review of Sociology 24  
Fraser, H. (2004) Doing Narrative Research: Analysing personal stories line by line, 
Qualitative Social Work 3 (2) pp. 179-201 
Frid, I., Ohlen, J. and Bergbom, I. (2000) On the use of narratives in nursing research, 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 32 (3) pp. 695-703 
Frogget, L. and Chamberlayne, P. (2004) Narratives of Social Enterprise: From 
biography to practice and policy critique, Qualitative Social Work 3 (1) pp. 61-
77 
Foucault, M. (1984) What is Enlightenment? In Paul Rabinow (ed.) The Foucault 
Reader (London, Penguin) pp. 32-50  
Gaita, R. (1998) A Common Humanity, (London, Routledge) 
Glasby, J. and Lester, H. (2005) On the Inside: A narrative review of mental health 
inpatient services, British Journal of Social Work 35, pp. 863-879 
Gitlin, A. and Russell, R. (1994) Alternative Methodologies and the Research Context 
in Gitlin, A. (ed) Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational 
Research (New York, Routledge) 
Goodson, I.F. (1997) Representing teachers, Teaching and Teacher Education, 13 (1) 
pp. 111-117 
Gow, L. and McPherson, A. (eds.) (1980) Tell Them from Me, (Aberdeen University 
Press) 
Griffiths, M. (1995a) Feminisms and the Self: The Web of Identity (London and New 
York, Routledge)  
Griffiths, M. (1995b) (Auto)biography and Epistemology, Educational Review 47 (1) 
pp. 75-88 
Griffiths, M. (1998) Educational Research for Social Justice: Getting off the Fence, 
(Buckingham, Open University Press)  
 20 
Griffiths, M. (2003) Action for social justice in education: fairly different,  
(Maidenhead, Open University Press) 
Griffiths, M. and Barr, J. (2007) ‘Training the imagination to “go visiting”‘ in M. 
Walker and J. Nixon (eds.) Reclaiming Universities from a Runaway World 
(Buckingham, Open University Press)  
Gudmundsdottir, S. (1997) Introduction to the theme issue of ‘narrative perspectives 
on research on teaching and teacher education, Teaching and Teacher 
Education 13 (1) pp. 1-3 
Hammersley, M. (2002) Educational Research: Policymaking and Practice, (London, 
Paul Chapman) 
Heikkinen, H.L.T., Huttunen, R. and Kakkori, L. (2000) ‘And this story is true’: On 
the problem of narrative truth, Paper presented to ECER, Edinburgh, 
September, www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/00002351.htm (Accessed 28 
February, 2007) 
Heikkinen, H., Kakkori, L. and Huttenen, R. (2001) This is my truth, tell me yours: 
Some aspects of action research quality in the light of truth theories, 
Educational Action Research 9(1) pp. 9-24 
Heikkinen, H.L.T.,  Huttunen, R. and Syrjälä, L (2007) Action research as narrative: 
five principles for validation, Educational Action Research 15 (1) pp. 5-19 
Hitchcock, g. and Hughes, D. (1995) Research and the Teacher (second edition) 
(London, Routledge) 
Hogan, P. (2000) Virtue, vice and vacancy in educational policy and practice, British 
Journal of Educational Studies 48 (4). pp. 371-390 
Jolly, M. (2001) (ed) Encyclopedia of Life Writing:Autobiographical and 
Biographical Forms, (Chicago, Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers) 
Jones, G., O'Sullivan, A. and Rouse, J. (2004) "Because It's Worth It?": Education 
Beliefs Among Young People and Their Parents in the United Kingdom, Youth 
& Society 36 (2) pp.  203-226 
Jordens, C. F. C. and Little, M. (2004) 'In This Scenario, I Do This, for These 
Reasons': Narrative, Genre and Ethical Reasoning in the Clinic, Social Science 
& Medicine 58 (9) pp. 1635-1645 
Krog, A. (1998) Country of My Skull, (London, Cape) 
Kvernbekk, T. (2003) On identifying narratives, Studies in Philosophy and Education 
22, pp. 267-279 
Lather, P. (1994) Fertile Obsession: Validity after Poststructuralism in Gitlin, A, (ed) 
Power and Method: Political Activism and Educational Research, (New York, 
Routledge) 
Lawson, H., Parker, M. and Sikes, P. (2006) Seeking Stories: reflections on a narrative 
approach to researching understanding of inclusion, European Journal of Special 
Needs Education 21 (1) pp. 55-68 
Lewis, C. S. (1996) The Hunting of the Snark,( Harmonsworth, Penguin) 
Lugones, M. (1989) ‘Playfulness, “world”-traveling and loving perception’ in Ann 
Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (eds.) Women, Knowledge and Reality, (Boston, 
Unwin Hyman)  
Lyotard, J-F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge, (Manchester 
University Press) 
Lyotard, J-F (1989) The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, Trans.  George Van Den 
Abbeele, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press) 
MacLure, M. (2003) Discourse in Educational and Social Research, (Buckingham, 
Open University Press) 
 21 
Mauthner, M. (2000) Snippets and silences: ethics and reflexivity in narratives of 
sistering, International Journal of Social Research Methodology 3 (4) pp. 287-
306 
McCrone, D. (2001) (second edition) Understanding Scotland: the Sociology of a 
Nation, (London, Routledge) 
McCloskey, D. N. (1990) Storytelling in Economics. In Nash, C (Ed.) Narrative in 
Culture: The Uses of Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy, and Literature, 
pp. 5-22 (London, Routledge) 
McDowell, L. (2001) 'It's that Linda again': Ethical, Practical and Political Issues 
Involved in Longitudinal Research with Young Men, Ethics, Place and 
Environment 4 (2) pp. 87-100 
McNulty, M. A. (2003) Dyslexia and the Life Course Journal of Learning Disabilities 
36 (4) pp. 363-81  
McPherson, A. (1983) ‘An Angle on the Geist: Persistence and Change in the Scottish 
Educational tradition’ in Humes, W. H. and Paterson, H. M. (eds) Scottish 
Culture and Scottish Education 1800-1980, Edinburgh, John Donald Publishers 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2006-7) valid, http://www.m-
w.com/dictionary/valid (Accessed 3 August, 2007) 
Moen, T. (2006) Reflections on the narrative research approach, International Journal 
of Qualitative Methods, 5 (4)  
Moon, C. (2006) Narrating Political Reconciliation: Truth and Reconciliation in 
South Africa, Social and Legal Studies 15 (2) pp. 257 - 275 
Muller-Merback (2006) Three kinds of knowledge, reflecting Kant’s three kinds of 
action, Knowledge management research and practice 4, pp. 73-74 
Munn, P. (2005) Researching Policy and Policy Research, Scottish Educational 
Review 37(1) 
Munn, P., Riddell, S., Lloyd, G., Macleod, G., Stead, J., Kane, J. and Fairley, J. 
(2005) Evaluation of the Discipline Task Group Recommendations:  The 
Deployment of Additional Staff to Promote Positive School Discipline.  
Research Report to the Scottish Executive Education Department, available at 
www.scotland.gov.uk/Home 
Nutley, S. M., Walter, I. and Davies, H.T.O. (2007) Using Evidence: How research 
can inform public services (Bristol, Policy Press) 
Oakley, A. (1984) Taking it Like a Woman, (London, Cape) 
O’Neill, O. (1996) Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical 
Reasoning, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 
Ozga, J. (2004) From research to policy and practice: some issues in knowledge 
transfer CES Briefing No.31 Centre for Educational Sociology University of 
Edinburgh available online at www/ces.ed.ac.uk/PDF%20Files/Brief031.pdf 
(Accessed 8th May 2007) 
Ozga, J. and Jones, R. (2006) Travelling and embedded policy: the case of knowledge 
transfer Journal of Education Policy 21 (1) pp. 1-17 
Paterson, L. (2003) Scottish Education in the Twentieth Century, (Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press) 
Peters, M. and Besley, T. (2006) The narrative turn: Critical educational studies and 
the poetics of resistance, Paper presented at PESGB, Oxford 
Phillips, D.C. (1997) Telling the truth about stories, Teaching and Teacher Education, 
13 (1) pp. 101-109 
 22 
Pirrie, A. and Macleod, G. (2007) Tracking pupils excluded from PRUs and special 
schools: some methodological concerns paper presented at Work With Young 
People Conference Leicester 14th-15th June 2007 
Pollard, A. (2005) Explorations in Teaching and Learning: A Biographical Narrative 
and Some Enduring Issues International Studies in Sociology of Education 15 
(1) pp. 87-105 
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1995). Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis In Hatch, 
J. A. & Wisniewski, R. (eds) Life History and Narrative (pp5-23) (London, The 
Falmer Press) 
Raffe, D. (2003) ‘How Distinctive is Scottish Education?  Five Perspectives on 
Distinctiveness’ paper presented to Scottish Educational Research Association, 
Annual Conference, Perth 27-29 November 2003 
Reissman, C. K. (1993) Narrative Analysis, (California, Sage)  
Richardson, L. (1992) 'The Poetic Representation of Lives: Writing a Postmodern 
Sociology'; Studies in Symbolic Interaction 13, pp. 19-29 
Sanders, J. and Munford, R. (2005) Activity and Reflection: Research and Change 
with Diverse Groups of Young People, Qualitative Social Work 4 (2) pp. 197-
209 
Santoro, N., Kamler, B., and Reid, J.(2001) Teachers Talking Difference: teacher 
education and the poetics of anti-racism, Teaching Education 12 (2) pp. 191- 
212 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1958) Being and Nothingness  (Trans. Hazel Barnes) (London, 
Methuen) 
Saunders, L. (2003) On flying, writing poetry and doing educational research, British 
Educational Research Journal, 29 (2) pp. 175-187 
Scottish Parliament (2002) 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/historic/education/or-
02/ed02-1902.htm  (Accessed 2nd May 2007)  
Searle, J. R. (1964) How to dervive an 'ought' from an 'is', The Philosophical Review 
73(1) pp. 43-58 
Smeyers, P. (2007) The Hidden Homogenisation of Educational Research: on opening 
up the sphere of educational responsiveness, in Smeyers, P., & Depaepe, M. 
(Eds.) Educational Research / Networks and Technologies (Dordrecht, 
Springer) 
Smeyers, P. and Verhesschen, P. (2001) Narrative analysis as philosophical research: 
bridging the gap between the empirical and the conceptual, International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 14 (1) 71084 
Smith, S. and Watson, J. (2001) Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting 
Life Narratives (Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press) 
Stanley, L. (1993) On Auto/Biography in Sociology, Sociology 27 (1) pp. 41-52 
Stroobants V. (2005) Stories about learning in narrative biographical research, 
International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 18 (1) pp. 47-61 
Symes, R. and Ridgers, B. (1995) The educative 'I' in 19th-century women's 
autobiographies, in Julia Swindells ed. The Uses of Autobiography (London, 
Taylor and Francis) 
Thomas Coram Research Unit (2007) 
http://ioewebserver.ioe.ac.uk/ioe/cms/get.asp?cid=470&470_0=8104 (accessed 
28th May 2007) 
Thompson, P. (2004) Pioneering the Life-Story Method, International Journal of 
Social Research Methodology 7 (1) pp. 81-84 
 23 
Townsend, Lucy and Weiner, Gaby, Deconstructing and Reconstructing Lives: Using 
Autobiography in Educational Settings, (Althouse Press, in preparation) 
Ungar, M. (2004) Nurturing Hidden Resilience in Troubled Youth, (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press) 
Ungar, M. (2006) 'Too Ambitious': What Happens when Funders Misunderstand the 
Strengths of Qualitative Research Design, Qualitative Social Work, 5(2) pp. 
261-277 
Vithal, Renuka. (2002) Crucial Descriptions: Talking back to theory and practice in 
mathematics education through research in the Proceedings of the Third 
International Mathematics Education and Society Conference, pp 501-511. 
Helsingor, Denmark.  http://www.mes3.learning.aau.dk/Papers/Vithal.pdf 
(Accessed January, 2008) 
Walker, M. and Unterhalter, E. (2004) Knowledge, narrative and national 
reconciliation: storied reflections on the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 25 (2) pp. 
279-297 
Watts, M. and Bridges, D. (2004) Whose Aspirations? What Achievement: an 
investigation of the life and lifestyle aspirations of 16-19 year olds outside the 
formal educational system, (Cambridge, East of England Development Agency)  
Wells, B. and Cunningham, P. (1995) Autobiography and educational change, in Julia 
Swindells ed. The Uses of Autobiography ( 
Wetle, T., Shield, R., Teno, J., Miller, S. C. and Welch, L. (2005) Family Perspectives 
on End-of-Life Care Experiences in Nursing Homes, Gerontologist 45 (5) pp. 
642 -650 
Whitehead, J. (1993) The Growth of Educational Knowledge, (Hyde, 
http://people.bath.ac.uk/edsajw/writings/jwgek93.htm 
Williams, B. (2002) Truth and Truthfulness: An essay in genealogy, (Princeton and 
Oxford, Princeton University Press)  
Wright Mills, C. (1959) The Sociological Imagination, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press) 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1
 Of course, with space limited we omit much more than we include. The decisions about what to leave 
out should not in any way be taken as a judgement of their importance or potential contribution to the 
question at hand, simply that the issues that we do take up are those which we judge most germane to 
the focus of this article. For example it is not within the remit of this paper to conduct a detailed 
examination of the defining features of  narrative research, e.g. Ricouer's work on the relationship 
between temporality and narrative; the notion of human life as 'storied'; the rhetorical power of 
narrative; conceptualisations of the 'self'; developmental aspects of narrative; the general philosophical 
discussion of epistemology and ‘testimony’; psycho-social approaches to narrative and memory; etc. 
2
 There is much more that could be added here about the phenomenology of human presence. For 
instance, see Sartre’s (1958) influential discussion of the Look and how it cuts through the attempt to 
make the Other into an object. (See especially pp. 258-9.) Similarly Gaita  (1998) discusses the zense 
of the preciousness of each human being which he distinguishes from concepts such as inalienable 
human rights, or persons as ends in themselves.  There is also something to be said about how we can 
lose that sense or have it brought into our attention. He quotes Weil: if you want to become invisible, 
there is no surer way than to become poor` (Gaita, 1998,  p. 10). 
3
 In a number of publications Griffiths has argued for the view that reliable knowledge is always 
provisional and revisable (Griffiths 1995a, 1995b, 1998, 2003).   
4
 For more on facts and their interpretation, see Griffiths, 1998, Chapter 4. 
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5
 We have not included a discussion of truthfulness to be found in fiction.  It is an interesting, relevant 
subject but we have not the space to examine it here. 
6
 See Smeyers useful discussion of ‘opening up the sphere of responsiveness’,drawing on Wittgenstein 
and Cavell.  (Smeyers, 2007)  
7
 As Nutley, Walter and Davies (2007) clearly show policy-making is not a simple linear process which 
always operates from the top-down, rather it is a complex and interactive process between 
practitioners, organisations and policy settings. Educational policy can be characterised as varying 
across four key dimensions.  First is the substantive area addressed, e.g., pupil assessment, teacher 
training, social justice.  Second is the level at which the policy is to be applied, e.g., pupil, classroom, 
school, or authority.  Third is the stage of the policy cycle: identification of the problem and agenda 
setting, analysis, creation, legislation and/or adoption, implementation, and evaluation. Fourth is the 
source of policy change (Doyle, 1997; Nutley, Walter and Davies 2007):  research; locally accepted 
mythologies and symbols; models of change (e.g. a technical-rational prescribe and intervene vs the 
diagnose and understand approach); and personal experience. All of these are moderated by the 
influence of global trends and the extent to which travelling policy becomes colonised by local context 
and embedded policy (Ozga, 2006)   
